
An Internet-Wide View of ICS Devices

A. Mirian, **Zane Ma**, D. Adrian, M. Tischer, T. Chuenchujit, T. Yardley, R. Berthier, J. Mason, Z. Durumeric, J. Halderman, M. Bailey



Industrial Control Systems (ICS)

Operational control and monitoring for industrial processes








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







ICS protocols assume system isolation

Evolution: **analog wire** \rightarrow digital fieldbus \rightarrow Ethernet



ICS protocols assume system isolation

Evolution: analog wire \rightarrow digital fieldbus \rightarrow Ethernet



Supervisory Computer


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
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Internet connectivity allows remote control of multiple ICSes

ICS protocols assume system isolation

Evolution: analog wire \rightarrow digital fieldbus \rightarrow Ethernet



Internet connectivity allows remote control of multiple ICSes

Public Internet = exposure to malicious attackers

Remote ICS attack

U.S. investigators find proof of cyberattack on Ukraine power grid

December 2015

30 substations remotely disabled

225,000 people without power



Research Questions

Understanding the ICS security ecosystem:

- 1) **Vulnerability assessment** What ICS protocols and devices are exposed on the public Internet?
- 2) Threat landscape Who is actively scanning for these vulnerable devices? Why are they scanning?

ZMap: Fast IPv4 Scanning



Port scanning tool by Durumeric et. al in 2013 USENIX Security Symposium

Fast: ZMap is *1300 times* faster than NMap

Single port IPv4 scan on one machine in under 45 mins

Extensible: architecture for application-level protocol scanners (i.e. HTTP, SSH)

Well-tooled: Censys scan database and querying infrastructure

Used in hundreds of academic studies

Detecting ICS Devices

1) Port scans - 10 most common ICS protocol ports

Upper-bound: port overlap with non-ICS services

2) Protocol scans - Implemented 5 protocol parsers

Modbus, BACnet, Tridium Fox, Siemens S7, DNP3

Lower-bound: only query common configs / protocol device addresses

Ethical Scanning

Reducing scan impact

Scan in random order to avoid overwhelming networks

Signal benign nature over HTTP and w/ DNS hostnames

Honor all scan exclusion requests

Ethical Scanning

Reducing scan impact

Scan in random order to avoid overwhelming networks

Signal benign nature over HTTP and w/ DNS hostnames

Honor all scan exclusion requests

Special ICS considerations

Extensive local testing prior to scanning

Benign queries that do not alter device state



Found: ICS Devices

Full IPv4 scans between March 14-19, 2016

Upper bound: ~4 million devices Lower bound: 69,000 devices for 5 protocols

31.5% more devices found than previously reported by Matherly, J.C.

Top protocols:

- 1) Tridium Fox 26,299 devices
- 2) Modbus 21,596 devices
- 3) BACnet 16,752 devices
- 4) Siemens S7 2,357 devices
- 5) DNP3 419 devices

Tridium Fox

Proprietary protocol for building automation

Coordinates supervisory systems

Country	Hosts	Percent
United States	19,219	71.6%
Canada	1,590	5.9%
United Kingdom	928	3.5%
Netherlands	892	3.3%
Australia	718	2.7%
Other (79 countries)	1,601	6.0%



Modbus

Designed in 1979!

Master-slave architecture

Limited to 247 devices on network





WHOIS lookups for Orange AS


Industry - Orange A.S. ASes	Hosts	Percent
Energy	71	7.1%
Water and Sanitation	13	1.3%
Food and Beverage	8	0.8%
Government	6	0.6%
Education	2	0.2%
HVAC	1	0.1%
Industrial Supply	1	0.1%
Uncategorized	897	89.8%


Increasing ICS Exposure

Protocol	December 2015	March 2016	Percent Increase
BACnet	16,752	16,813	0.4%
DNP3	419	429	2.3%
Modbus	21,596	23,120	7.1%
Fox	26,299	26,535	0.9%
S7	2,357	2,798	18.7%









Research Questions

Understanding the ICS security ecosystem:

- 1) **Vulnerability assessment** What ICS protocols and devices are exposed on the public Internet?
- 2) Threat landscape Who is actively scanning for these vulnerable devices? Why are they scanning?

Darknet = large blocks of unused IP address space

Any darknet traffic is attributable to:

- 1) misconfiguration
- 2) spoofed IP backscatter
- 3) active scanning

Passively collect UDP/TCP traffic for all ports on a /8 subnet

	Modbus	BACnet	TCP/102	DNP3	Ethernet	Fox	Hart	All Protocols
All ICS Traffic	41.7%	30.6%	8.7%	5.1%	8.4%	3.1%	2.4%	
Shodan Search Engine	5.1%	7.2%	24.5%	65.5%	51.8%	71.2%	90%	18.5%
Kudelski Security	61.1%	86.2%						51.8%
Chinanet	4.2%		20.3%	29.3%	19.3%	21.2%		9.1%
University of Michigan	16.2%							6.7%
SoftLayer Technologies*	3.5%				23%			3.5%
ECATEL/Quasi Networks*	3.8%		9.3%	2.7%	2.8%		4.0%	2.4%
FDC Servers*				1.8%	2.2%	3.0%	3.8%	2.5%
Amazon EC2*			13%					1.1%
PlusServer AG*	1.8%		8.7%					1.6%
Reseau National de telecommunications pour la Technologie			5.7%					0.5%
Ukrainian Data Center*			5.3%					0.5%
Other	4.3%	6.6%	13.2%	0.7%	0.9%	4.6%	2.2%	1.8%

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Open source low-interaction honeypot

Simulates protocol behavior of a real device

Interactive traffic indicates live scanner

Supports S7, Modbus, BACnet

Actively collect interactive scanner behavior

20 Conpot instances on Amazon EC2

Dec 4, 2015 - Feb 14, 2016

Protocol / scanner distribution consistent with network telescope

Scanning is not correlated to the number of exposed devices

	Modbus	BACnet	Siemens S7	All
All ICS Traffic (total)	1954	520	2778	5252
All ICS Traffic (%)	37.2%	9.9%	52.9%	100%
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ECATEL: PLCScan*	10.3%	0.0%	5.0%	6.5%
China169	2.1%	0.0%	8.4%	5.2%
ZNet*	3.1%	2.9%	3.6%	3.3%
ECATEL: Other*	4.0%	3.3%	2.6%	3.2%
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
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Modbu	IS	21,596	devices (53	5%)
BACne	et	16,752	devices (41	%)
Sieme	ns S7	2,357	devices (6%	6)
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Scan Behaviors

Relatively benign scanning

Modbus example:



70% - Read device identification

30% - *Report slave ID* for slave address 0 or 255 (default if empty)

No actuating commands or configuration enumeration

Responsible Disclosure

Part of a study by Li et. al in 2013 USENIX Security Symposium

Vulnerability notifications for 79% of hosts with abuse WHOIS contacts

~7% of notified WHOIS contacts removed their ICS devices from Internet

Still a large remainder of exposed devices - repeat notifications ineffective



ICS insecurity: ICS protocols were designed for *isolated* systems

No built-in Internet security

Vulnerability assessment: Found 69,000 Internet-exposed ICS devices

Increasing over time

Threat landscape: Majority of scanning is by researchers

Some from suspicious bulletproof hosts

An Internet-Wide View of ICS Devices

A. Mirian, **Zane Ma**, D. Adrian, M. Tischer, T. Chuenchujit, T. Yardley, R. Berthier, J. Mason, Z. Durumeric, J. Halderman, M. Bailey

